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ABSTRACT
WILL HENGEHOLD: EDUCATION, INCOME, RACIAL COMPOSITION, AND
URBANIZATION: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS THAT AFFECT INTERVENTION
COURT PARTICIPATION AND DRUG-RELATED ARRESTS IN MISSISSIPPI
(Under the direction of Dr. John Conlon)
This paper serves as an evaluation of Mississippi Intervention Courts and attempts to determine
the effectiveness and use of those courts. The regressions in this paper attempt to show how the
use of intervention courts and demographic characteristics of Mississippi District Circuit Courts
affect the number of drug-related arrests in Mississippi, how the number of drug-related arrests
and demographic characteristics of Mississippi district circuit courts areas affect intervention
court use and intervention court participation rates in Mississippi, and how demographic
characteristics affected the delay in the adoption of intervention courts by Mississippi District
Circuit Courts. Demographic characteristic variables used include education, income, racial
composition, and urbanization. Regression analyses including ordinary least squares regressions,
lagged-dependent variable regressions, and fixed-effects models are used in this paper to
determine these effects. Many of the coefficients on the variables in these regressions are
statistically insignificant. However, the regression of intervention court use on drug-related
arrests per capita and demographic characteristics does conclude that an increase in the number
of drug-related arrests per capita decreases the use of intervention courts in Mississippi by a
substantial amount. The results from these regressions, along with input from Judge Starrett, the
founder of the first intervention court in Mississippi, are used to justify a recommendation to
Mississippi legislators to increase intervention court use in times of rising drug-related arrests.
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Intervention Courts
An Overview of Intervention Courts
The “War on Drugs” was a major event in the history of drug use in the United States. Nixon’s
policies on drug crime decreased the supply of illegal drugs entering the United States and the
number of drugs being used by Americans substantially; however, the cost of those policies was
not solely increased budgets for federal drug-control agencies. At this time, the average cost to
imprison someone for a year was over $30,000 (Kyckelhahn, 2014), and Nixon introduced
measures such as mandatory sentencing and no-knock warrants to put his enemies in the war
behind bars more easily. From 1980 to 1997, the number of people behind bars for non-violent
drug offenses, therefore, increased from 50,000 to over 400,000 (Drug Policy Alliance, 2020).
Thus, people began to see the need to combat the rising cost of incarcerating drug offenders. In
1989, the first Felony Drug Treatment Court (DTC) was founded in Dade County, Florida on the
premise that addiction is more of a disease than a crime (Lurigio, 2008). This court system
would serve as a template for many other DTCs to come over the next few decades.
It was not long until the state of Mississippi followed suit. The Hon. Judge Keith Starrett created
the first DTC in Mississippi in 1999 in the 14th Judicial Circuit Court District. “We started the
drug court in 1999, when we were at the height of the crack explosion… Crack is a tough drug to
get people off of” (Judge Starrett, personal communication). This was a time when many drug
addicts and drug abusers would have benefited from the existence of an alternative to
incarceration; an alternative providing a much more robust support network and better access to
rehabilitation services. To create this path for criminal drug addicts and drug abusers, Judge
Starrett first had to get support from the state legislature. Here’s what he had to say about
starting the first DTC in Mississippi: “I needed good numbers to get the legislature to pay
attention and to look at this program as a viable alternative (to incarceration). So, we put a lot of
people in there that we figured could succeed, and they did, and we got some good statistics.
The legislature paid attention and the program started being developed.” Shortly after Judge
Starrett gained approval from state legislators, the concept caught on and, in 2003, a law was
passed allowing for the creation of Felony Intervention Courts statewide at chancery, circuit,
county, youth, municipal, or justice court levels (State of Mississippi Judiciary, no date). But, in
retrospect, Judge Starrett said that picking the “low-hanging fruit”, those low-risk offenders
whom you know will probably succeed even without DTCs, was not the best way to do it: “you
go after the high-risk offenders. That’s who you want because you’re spending a lot of money
on the program. Why waste resources on people who don’t need it?”
Shortly after the law was passed, at the legislative session in Jackson, State Auditor Phil Bryant
released the results of a feasibility study conducted by the performance audit division of his
office, calling the Intervention Court system an “effective, community-based strategy to reduce
1

drug use and crime, generate cost savings at the local and state level and allow statewide
exchange of information between Circuit Court districts”. The report went on to estimate a costsavings of 5.4 million dollars per year for every 500 participants in Mississippi Intervention
Courts (State of Mississippi Judiciary, no date). After serving as a DTC judge in Mississippi for
6 years, Judge Starrett went on to serve as the chairman of the National Association of Drug
Court Professionals (NADCP) where he helped spread the use of DTCs in areas across the
nation. Today, intervention courts around the nation are on average very effective in keeping
participants drug-free. As Judge Starrett put it, “after three years, 75% of the people who
completed the (DTC) program were still drug-free. That’s a national statistic that was verified
by our experience in the fourteenth district. Before drug courts, 25% would be clean and sober
after three years” (Judge Starrett, personal communication). The developments made by Judge
Starrett and other proponents of DTC programs laid the groundwork for an efficient system that
keeps up the fight against drugs by treating non-violent drug abusers rather than punishing them.
Additionally, these programs save the state substantial amounts of funds that otherwise would be
spent on imprisoning these offenders.
Today, there are 22 Intervention Courts in Mississippi; one in each of the 22 circuit court
districts. Each of these courts must incorporate 10 key components of drug courts into their
program, outlined by the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the U.S. Justice Department. These key
components include:
1. Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system
case processing.
2. Using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote public
safety while protecting participants’ due process rights.
3. Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug court
program.
4. Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related
treatment and rehabilitation services.
5. Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing.
6. A coordinated strategy governs drug court responses to participants’ compliance.
7. Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court participant is essential.
8. Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge
effectiveness.
9. Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective drug court planning,
implementation, and operations.
10. Forging partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and community-based
organizations generates local support and enhances drug court program effectiveness.
(Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1999)
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These components of intervention courts are not the only determinants of success for program
participants. In my interview with Judge Starrett, he told me that a supportive family and welltrained DTC professionals, such as court officers and coordinators, can help keep participants on
track with their progress in the program. Additionally, job programs help fill the participant’s
time with positive rather than negative surroundings and socialization programs help to surround
the participants with positive role models (Judge Starrett, personal communication). These
additional key components are as important as the 10 key components outlined above. If all of
these components of DTCs are satisfied, the program can provide life-changing assistance to
those addicted to drugs or abusing drugs, save the state money that would have been spent on
incarceration, and reduce the number of drug-related crimes in an area.

Purpose and Significance of This Research
One of the key components of drug courts (component 8) requires that drug courts monitor and
evaluate the achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness. My paper serves as an
attempted evaluation of Mississippi Intervention Courts and uses statistical methods to determine
the effectiveness of Mississippi Intervention Courts in reducing drug-related arrests. Since my
data is limited, and since intervention court programs in Mississippi are still relatively small
compared to the number of drug-related arrests, I have difficulty measuring any effects of
intervention courts on aggregate drug crime.
Later on, in this paper, I therefore turn to an attempt to determine when intervention courts are
more likely to be used, and when they are more likely to be successful in terms of successful
completions of the program. In particular, I look at the effect of the number of drug-related
arrests per capita and demographic variables on intervention court participation and intervention
court success rates. Finally, I look at how demographic variables affected the delay in the
adoption of intervention courts by district circuit courts. The initial regressions presented in this
paper try to identify causal relationships within the regressions described above. However, only
three years of data are currently available for my initial set of regressions, and only one year of
data is available for the subsequent regressions. Therefore, it is difficult to learn much from the
data.
Hopefully, this paper can therefore be expanded upon when additional data becomes available
for subsequent years. Also, additional variables could be added to assess Mississippi
Intervention Courts’ abilities to reduce recidivism for felony drug offenders, reduce overdose
deaths, and discourage violent crimes among drug abusers and drug addicts.

3

Chapter 2: Review of Prior Literature
Since the first DTC was adopted in 1989, there have been many studies gauging the effectiveness
of the programs. Quite a few of those studies try to assess the effectiveness of DTCs across the
country by using drug crime recidivism as the main metric. One such study (Kearley and
Gottfredson, 2019) compares variables such as the amount of time spent in incarceration and the
rate of recidivism from a random sample of drug court participants from the Baltimore City DTC
to a control group of drug offenders who received traditional adjudication. In authors conclude
that offenders who participated in the Baltimore City DTC had lower mortality rates, fewer days
of incarceration, and lower cumulative rates of recidivism (including both arrests and
convictions) after 15 years, as compared to the control group (Kearley and Gottfredson, 2019).
Another study that measures DTC effectiveness using recidivism (Rampel et al., 2012) uses three
variables to compare offenders from 23 DTC programs to offenders from six comparison groups.
The three variables studied are self-reported criminal behavior up to 18 months after release,
official re-arrests up to 24 months after release, and the sentence length on the case that brought
the offenders to either the intervention court or a comparison court in the first place, referred to
as the “precipitating case”. This is the only study I have found that records study participants’
self-reported criminal behavior. It is likely that not all participants who committed criminal acts
after DTC graduation or release from a comparison program reported those acts. However, the
ability of this study to capture some of the criminal acts that go unnoticed by law enforcement
provides a more accurate measure of the number of crimes that are committed by the study
participants than just official re-arrests alone. In the conclusion, the authors find that DTCs
reduce criminal acts by more than 50% over 18 months but do not reduce the average sentence
length on the precipitating case. Even though DTC participants who graduate from the program
receive very little or no time in prison, those who fail the program usually receive an increased
sentence over what they would have been given had they not entered the program at all (Rampel
et al., 2012).
The two aforementioned studies mainly look at how the use of DTCs affect recidivism rates for
its participants. However, it is not possible for me to look at recidivism rates in Mississippi,
given that I do not have access to program participants to interview or documents that record
such measures. Additionally, these studies look at the overall effectiveness of DTC programs
across the country, while I specifically want to narrow the scope of my research to just the state
of Mississippi.
Currently, the only evaluation of Mississippi DTCs listed on the Intervention Courts page of the
State of Mississippi Judiciary website is a paper prepared by the Mississippi Department of
Statistical Analysis (Nored et al., 2007), which looks at demographic characteristics within six
Mississippi Intervention Courts jurisdictions including race, gender, type of offense, and whether
4

the offender graduated from the intervention court. This study aimed to identify whether or not
intervention court judges, participants, and court officers were satisfied with the effectiveness of
the courts. The authors concluded that there is an absence of standardized data-collection
procedures between courts, and recommended that the courts implement a state-wide
management information system (MIS) to facilitate data management. The paper also
recommends that the courts increase intervention court personnel and acquire increased state and
local funding to increase the number of participants the courts can accommodate, to reduce the
number of drug offenders incarcerated in state and local prisons (Nored et al., 2007).
In my research, I have not been able to find a study that looks at the effect of intervention courts
on drug-related arrests in Mississippi, so I hope to shed light on this issue. Another topic
missing from the current literature concerns when intervention courts are actually used by the
judicial system. This paper therefore also looks at the effect of the number of drug-related
arrests and demographic characteristics on the intervention court participation rate and the
intervention court completion rate. I also look at the effect that certain demographic
characteristics have on the delay in intervention court adoption by district circuit courts. I hope
to quantify these effects in this paper so that the state legislature can use my results to possibly
guide their decision-making processes to improve Mississippi Intervention Courts.

Chapter 3: Methodology
To conduct a statistical analysis on the efficacy of Mississippi Intervention Courts, I first needed
to identify a few variables on which I would need to collect data. The dependent variable I use
in the initial analyses is the number of drug-related arrests per capita by circuit court district.
Given that I could not find data on drug use by circuit court district and I do not have access to
data on individual intervention court participants, the number of drug-related arrests per capita is
the best dependent variable I can use to quantify how well these courts reduce drug use. The
independent variable I use in the initial analysis is the number of successful intervention court
completions by circuit court district per capita, which quantifies the number of drug-related
offenders who benefit from the program being in place as a percentage of the total district circuit
court population. For each of these variables, I decided to collect a cross-sectional time-series
data set so I could look at the effect of intervention court completion on drug use between
different courts in Mississippi as well as between the different years that intervention courts have
been used.

Data Collection
The initial plan for the analyses was to collect data on all of the variables included in this
analysis for each district circuit court over the four years before each Mississippi Intervention
5

Court was created as well as the four years after each Mississippi Intervention Court was created.
I wanted to be able to perform a difference-of-differences analysis that looks at how the creation
of intervention courts affected drug-related arrests. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court has
just recently started to release quantitative data on drug courts through their annual reports. I
was able to find the number of successful drug court completions for 2020 by circuit court
district in the 2020 Annual Report, and, after corresponding with the court’s Public Information
Officer, Beverly Kraft, I was able to obtain the number of successful drug court completions for
2018 and 2019 by circuit court district as well. It was not possible to find the number of
successful intervention court completions for the four years before intervention court was created
in Mississippi, as many of the district intervention courts were established between 2001 and
2011, and quantitative data on their successes have not been recorded until 2018, as far as I
know.
The Mississippi Prescription Monitoring Program’s website provides data on the number of
drug-related arrests by county in Mississippi for the years 2017 to 2020. To make this data
consistent with the data on successful drug-court completions, I had to determine the number of
drug-related arrests for each district by adding the number of drug-related arrests in each county
in that district.
To control for the fact that some districts have higher populations, and are therefore more likely
to have a higher number of drug-related arrests (DRA) and successful Intervention Court
completions (SC), DRA and SC were transformed into per capita measures by dividing each data
point by the total population in the corresponding district and year, resulting in drug-related
arrests per capita (DRAPC) and successful intervention court completions per capita (SCPC).
After a preliminary analysis of the effect of the number of successful intervention court
participants per capita on the number of drug-related arrests per capita using an OLS regression
with no controls and robust standard errors, I saw an unexpected positive, but insignificant,
relationship between these variables (Figure 3.1). All regressions in this paper were performed
using Gretl software for Mac OS.
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Figure 3.1: OLS Regression of DRAPC on SCPC
Model 1: Pooled OLS, using 66 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 3
Dependent variable: DRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------const
0.463749
0.0944569
4.910
7.42e-05 ***
SCPC
1.17091
3.51040
0.3336
0.7420
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(1, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho

0.485200
5.375948
0.002418
0.111258
-10.89519
30.16969
0.811751

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.287936
0.289826
-0.013169
0.742023
25.79038
27.52085
0.154016

This figure shows the results from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of DRAPC on SCPC. DRAPC
denotes drug-related arrests per capita and SCPC denotes successful intervention court completions per
capita. P-values with three asterisks (***) indicate that the coefficient on that variable is statistically
significant at an alpha level of 0.01. Two asterisks (**) and one asterisk (*) indicate that the coefficient on
that variable is statistically significant at alpha levels of 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.

At first glance, this analysis seems to indicate that each additional SCPC increased the number of
drug-related arrests in that circuit court district by about 1.17 between the years of 2018 to 2020.
This is the opposite of what one would expect, given that each district court has created an
intervention court aimed at reducing the number of drug-related arrests in their district.
However, upon closer inspection, this positive relation could be the result of reverse-causality
within the model, meaning that instead of more intervention courts causing an increased number
of drug-related arrests, more drug-related arrests precipitate a need for more drug courts.
To try to reduce this problem of reverse causality, more variables were added as controls in an
attempt to isolate the causality between the number of drug-related arrests and the number of
successful intervention court participants. The median household income (MHI), percent of nonHispanic White residents (NHW), and the percentage of residents with a high-school diploma
(HSD) in each county were recorded from the Federal Reserve’s FRED website. The level of
urbanization (URB) was collected for each county from the U.S. Census Bureau for the year
2010. URB is the percentage of the total population in each county that is classified as urban.
The 2010 data on urbanization levels is the most recent data available; however, given that
urbanization levels do not drastically change over time, I do not think it is too misleading to use
these same values for the years 2018-2021. The data on MHI, NHW, HSD, and URB was then
weighted by the population of the respective county as a percentage of the total district
population and summed to transform the county-level data into population-weighted variables
7

for each district, so that the data for the dependent and independent variables were consistent
with each other. For example, for the MHI we get the average MHI or AMHI:
𝑛𝑖

𝐴𝑀𝐻𝐼𝐷𝑖 = ∑(
𝑗=1

𝑃𝐶𝑗
) ∗ 𝑀𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑗 .
𝑃𝐷𝑖

Here, ni represents the number of counties in each circuit court district, i, while j indexes
counties within the circuit court district, PCj represents the county-level population, PDi
represents the district-level population, MHICj represents the median household income in each
county, and AMHIDi represents the average of median household income for each district
weighted by each county’s median household income in each district. The same equation was
used for NHW, HSD, and URB.

Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3.2: Initial Summary Statistics
DRAPC
SCPC
AMHI
NHW
HSD
URB

Mean
0.48520
0.018320
43930
52.648
82.974
44.555

Median
0.47086
0.016801
43226
56.720
83.260
39.385

Minimum
0.0000
0.0000
30305
24.950
75.690
5.1700

Maximum
1.1137
0.051166
70115
75.730
90.430
84.720

Std. Dev.
0.28794
0.0123093
8791.4
15.845
3.8528
19.838

DRAPC denotes drug-related arrests per capita, SCPC denotes successful intervention court completions per
capita, AMHI denotes the average of county-level median household incomes, NHW denotes the percentage of
residents who identify as non-Hispanic Whites, HSD denotes the percentage of residents who have obtained a
high school diploma, and URB denotes the percentage of residents who live in urbanized areas.

The above figure (Figure 3.2) presents some simple summary statistics for each of the included
variables. AMHI is in dollars, while each other variable is in percentage terms (for example, the
mean DRAPC value is 0.4852 %).
Additionally, note that there were a total of 1560 successful intervention court completions in
Mississippi from 2018 to 2020, and a total of 50,786 drug-related arrests in Mississippi over the
same time-period. This means that the percentage of offenders charged with drug-related
offenses who participated in and successfully completed an intervention court program is only
about 3.07% of arrests. Therefore, it is not surprising that SCPC had no significant effect on
DRAPC in Figure 3.1 above.
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Figure 3.3
DRAPC
SCPC
AMHI
NHW
HSD
URB

DRAPC

SCPC

AMHI

NHW

HSD

URB

1.0000

0.0492

0.6342

0.4752

0.7011

0.2487

1.0000

-0.0396

0.0727

-0.1308

-0.1982

0.7638

0.2667

0.5042

-0.2430

1.0000

0.5039

1.0000

0.6299
1.0000

1.0000

DRAPC denotes drug-related arrests per capita, SCPC denotes successful intervention court completions per
capita, AMHI denotes the average of county-level median household incomes, NHW denotes the percentage of
residents who identify as non-Hispanic Whites, HSD denotes the percentage of residents who have obtained a
high school diploma, and URB denotes the percentage of residents who live in urbanized areas.

The above figure (Figure 3.3) presents a correlation matrix that lists the correlations between
each pair of variables on a scale of -1 to 1, where a correlation of -1 means that the two variables
are perfectly negatively correlated, a correlation of 0 means the variables are not correlated at all,
and a correlation of 1 means the variables are perfectly positively correlated. The largest
negative correlation coefficient exists between URB and NHW at -0.2430. This means that in
more urbanized areas, a lower percentage of residents are non-Hispanic Whites. The correlation
coefficient closest to 0 exists between DRAPC and SCPC at 0.0492, meaning that the number of
drug-related arrests per capita in an area is not highly correlated with the number of successful
intervention court completions per capita in that area. The largest positive correlation
coefficient, other than the correlation coefficient of a variable with itself (e.g. DRAPC on
DRAPC) exists between AMHI and HSD at 0.7638. This means that household incomes are
higher on average in areas with a higher percentage of residents who have obtained a high school
diploma.
It is important to look at the correlation coefficients between DRAPC and AMHI, NHW, HSD,
and URB to see how our control variables are correlated with our dependent variables. This will
give us an idea of how well our control variables will be able to explain the variation of DRAPC.
The correlation coefficient between DRAPC and AMHI is highly positive at 0.6342. This means
that a higher number of drug-related arrests per capita is correlated with higher household
incomes. One possibility is that higher-income people in Mississippi are more likely to commit
drug crimes than low-income people in Mississippi. An alternative reason for this correlation
could be because areas with higher household incomes have larger law enforcement budgets, so
there are more of all types of arrests, including drug-related arrests.
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For the correlation between DRAPC and URB we see a positive value of 0.2487, meaning that
there are a higher number of drug-related arrests per capita in urban areas as opposed to rural
areas. This is an interesting correlation. I would expect that, with the high concentration of
people in urban areas, it would be more difficult for law enforcement to crack down on drug
crime. However, it may be that Mississippi police officers in urban areas are more efficient at
stopping drug crime than Mississippi police officers in rural areas. Another possible explanation
for this correlation could be simply that there are a higher number of drug-related crimes per
capita in urban areas than in rural areas, and Mississippi police officers in urban areas are no
more efficient at stopping drug crime than Mississippi police officers in rural areas.
The correlation coefficient between DRAPC and NHW is also positive at 0.4752, meaning that a
higher number of drug-related arrests per capita is correlated with a higher percentage of nonHispanic Whites in the population. Because there are a higher number of drug-related arrests per
capita in urban areas than rural areas and urban areas have a lower number of non-Hispanic
whites than rural areas, there must be something else going on to cause this positive correlation.
One possible reason that the correlation between DRAPC and NHW is positive could be that
non-Hispanic Whites may be more likely to be arrested for drug crimes in Mississippi than other
races. Another possible reason may be that AMHI and NHW are highly positively correlated at
0.6299 and AMHI and DRAPC are also highly correlated, as mentioned above. This may be the
reason for the positive correlation, as NHW is much more positively correlated with AMHI than
it is negatively correlated with URB.
Lastly, DRAPC is highly positively correlated with HSD at 0.7011. This means that areas with
higher drug-related arrests per capita have a higher percentage of residents with a high school
diploma, on average. Given that AMHI is highly correlated with DRAPC and HSD, this positive
correlation may make sense: areas with higher HSD are likely to have higher household incomes
and are therefore more likely to have higher drug-related arrests per capita. Another reason that
these variables are highly positively correlated could simply be that those with high school
diplomas are more likely to commit drug crimes.
My initial expectation was that high-income, well-educated non-Hispanic Whites should be less
likely to be arrested for drug-related crimes. However, higher income, more well-educated areas
with more non-Hispanic whites have a larger number of drug-related arrests per capita compared
to areas with low income, less educated residents, and more people who identify as Hispanic
and/or non-White. My initial expectation could still be accurate though. It may not be that highincome; well-educated non-Hispanic Whites are more likely to be arrested for drug-related
crimes. Instead, areas with more of those people might have stricter laws regarding drug use and
distribution and are also more urbanized, given that urbanization is highly positively correlated
with HSD, positively correlated with AMHI, and negatively correlated only with NHW.
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Additional Statistical Methodologies
In addition to adding control variables, there are a few other ways to reduce the level of reversecausality in this regression. The first is to include a lag of DRAPC into the analysis. Figure 3.4
shows the relationship between DRAPC and DRAPC of the prior year, i.e., DRAPC t-1. This
relationship is strongly positive, meaning that a high number of drug-related arrests this year
most likely leads to a high number of drug-related arrests next year. When we control for lagged
drug crime by including DRAPCt-1 in the regression, the coefficient on SCPC is not forced to
pick up the effect of last year’s DRAPC on this year’s DRAPC. Thus, the inclusion of a lag of
DRAPC helps reduce omitted variable bias if drug-related arrests last year are correlated with
any of the omitted variables.

DRAPCt

Figure 3.4

DRAPCt-1

The second method used to reduce the effects of reverse causality in this analysis is the addition
of fixed effects. The data were tabulated into a panel data set, and a control dummy variable was
created for each circuit court district. A fixed-effects analysis can completely control for crosssectional omitted variable bias by isolating the effects of only the intertemporal variations in the
included independent variables on the dependent variable. However, this only eliminates the
omitted variable problem if one can assume that all omitted variables are intertemporally
constant, meaning they do not change over time. This is a strong assumption, but it must be
made to justify a fixed-effects analysis.
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Chapter 4: Effectiveness of Intervention Courts
The following table (Table 4.1) includes a summary of the regression performed in Chapter 3
above (Figure 3.1), along with five additional regressions. The first additional regression
introduces control variables into the OLS regression, the second introduces a lag of DRAPC, but
with no control variables, the third includes control variables and a lag of DRAPC, the fourth
uses a fixed-effects analysis but with no control variables, and the fifth uses a fixed-effects
analysis and includes control variables. The R2 value, a measure of how well the included
variables account for the variation in the dependent variable, was calculated for each regression,
as well as the p-value of the F-statistic, which measures whether the regression as a whole is
statistically significant. A regression might contain no statistically significant coefficients but
can still have a statistically significant p-value of the F-statistic if the coefficients are jointly
significant. It is therefore important to include this measure so that no regressions are thrown out
undeservedly.
Additionally, regressions were also performed with variables normalized about their means. For
example, the SCPC was normalized about its mean using this equation:
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐶 =

( 𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑖 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐶 )
.
𝑆𝐷(𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐶)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ represents the mean of all SCPC data points and 𝑆𝐷(𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐶) represents the standard
Here, 𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐶
deviation of all SCPC data points. The same equation was used for each variable contained in
the regressions. Coefficients were normalized about their means in this analysis to more easily
compare the effect of one independent variable to the effects of other independent variables on
the dependent variable. The top number in each cell of Table 4.1 is the coefficient from the
unnormalized regression, the middle number is the coefficient from the normalized regression,
and the bottom number is the p-value associated with those coefficients.
The discussion of Table 4.1 is divided into numbered paragraphs, each discussing each separate
regression individually to make it easier for the reader to reference the table while reading the
discussions. The discussion of Regression 2 begins with (2), the discussion of Regression 3
begins with (3), and so on.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Initial Regressions

The first column in the above table specifies which regression is being summarized in that row. The number in
parentheses before the regression description indicates the regression number. OLS indicates an ordinary
least squares regression, LDV indicates a lagged-dependent variable regression, and FE indicates a fixedeffects model. “Controls” refer to demographic control variables. Numbers in columns 2-6 show the
coefficient on the variable (the top value), the coefficient for the normalized regression (the middle value), and
the p-value associated with that coefficient (the bottom value). The final column in this table shows the pvalue of the F-statistic for the regression, denoted as p-value(F). P-values with three asterisks (***) indicate
that the coefficient on that variable is statistically significant at an alpha level of 0.01. Two asterisks (**) and
one asterisk (*) indicate that the coefficient on that variable is statistically significant at alpha levels of 0.05
and 0.1, respectively. DRAPC denotes drug-related arrests per capita, SCPC denotes successful intervention
court completions per capita, AMHI denotes the average of county-level median household incomes, NHW
denotes the percentage of residents who identify as non-Hispanic Whites, HSD denotes the percentage of
residents who have obtained a high school diploma, and URB denotes the percentage of residents who live in
urbanized areas.

(1) Regression 1 contains a positive coefficient on SCPC of 1.17, meaning that an increase of 1
percentage point in successful intervention court completions per capita (an increase of about 5
participants on average per year) would increase the number of drug-related arrests per capita by
1.17, or the total number of drug-related arrests by about 280 on average per year. However, this
coefficient is statistically insignificant, so it cannot be concluded that successful intervention
court completions have any effect on drug-related arrests in Mississippi from this regression.
Additionally, given that the R2 value of this regression is so low, the number of successful
completions does not explain much of the variation in the number of drug-related arrests.
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(2) Regression 2 contains a more positive coefficient on SCPC than Regression 1. This means
that even when we control for AMHI, NHW, HSD, and URB, we find that there is a positive
relationship between DRAPC and SCPC. However, like in Regression 1, this coefficient is not
significant at any accepted alpha level. The one significant coefficient is on HSD, and it is
positive. Again, this could suggest that people with high school diplomas are more likely to be
arrested for drug crimes in Mississippi. An alternative reason for this positive coefficient could
be that people with high school diplomas live in areas with a higher law enforcement budget,
which could increase the number of drug-related arrests per capita. The R2 value of this
regression is much higher than for Regression 1 (0.537 vs. 0.0024), meaning that the addition of
demographic control variables helps explain much more of the cross-sectional variation in
DRAPC than SCPC. Lastly, the p-value(F) is much smaller than the p-value on HSD, meaning
that, even though none of the other independent variables have statistically significant
coefficients separately, there must be some significant effect of at least one of those variables on
DRAPC.
(3) Regression 3 contains a negative coefficient on SCPC. This sign switch on the coefficient
may be due to the fact that the correlation between DRAPCt and DRAPCt-1 is highly positive.
Controlling for DRAPCt-1, the coefficient on SCPC is now negative. However, the coefficient on
SCPC is still not statistically significant, so it cannot be concluded that there is any effect of
SCPC on DRAPC from this regression. The R2 value of this regression is even higher than in
Regression 2, meaning that the addition of a lagged dependent variable helps explain more of the
cross-sectional variation of DRAPC, even without the demographic control variables. The pvalue(F) is statistically significant in this regression; however, this is not surprising, as the pvalue on DRAPCt-1 (not shown in the table) is incredibly small, at 7.59e-13.
(4) Regression 4 contains an even smaller negative coefficient on SCPC than Regression 3.
However, again, this coefficient is not statistically significant. In this regression, the only
statistically significant coefficient is on NHW, and that coefficient is positive, meaning that a
higher percentage of residents who identify as non-Hispanic Whites in an area leads to a higher
number of drug-related arrests per capita. Again, this might be surprising since it suggests that
non-Hispanic Whites are arrested for drug crimes more often than other races. However, it could
also be due to the fact that non-Hispanic whites are wealthier in Mississippi on average, and
higher-income areas could lead to higher law enforcement budgets. The R2 value of this
regression is higher than that of Regression 3, which could mean that introduction of
demographic control variables helps explain more of the cross-sectional variation in DRAPC.
Lastly, the p-value(F) of this regression is very small, much smaller than the p-value on NHW,
meaning that some of the other coefficients may actually be statistically significant. However,
this small p-value on this F-statistic may simply reflect the lagged dependent variable.
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(5) Regression 5 contains the largest negative coefficient on SCPC of any of the regressions in
Table 3.1. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant. The R 2 value of this
regression is higher than that of Regression 4, indicating that the use of a fixed-effects model
helps explain more of the variation in DRAPC than any previous regression, even without the
use of demographic control variables.
(6) Regression 6 also contains a negative coefficient on SCPC, though not as large as the one in
Regression 5. Again, this coefficient is not statistically significant. The only statistically
significant coefficient is on NHW. However, as opposed to Regression 4, this coefficient is
negative, meaning an increase in the percentage of residents who identify as non-Hispanic
Whites in a district leads to a smaller number of drug-related arrests per capita. This could
simply be interpreted as meaning non-Hispanic Whites are less likely to be arrested for drugrelated offenses. This does not necessarily mean that non-Hispanic Whites commit fewer drugrelated crimes than other racial groups, but rather that they are less likely to be caught doing
those crimes. The R2 value of this regression is the highest of any regression in Table 3.1,
indicating that this regression explains the most variation of DRAPC out of any of the
regressions in Table 3.1. Lastly, the p-value(F) of this regression is statistically significant, but
is larger than the p-value on the coefficient on NHW, meaning that it is unlikely that any other
independent variable in this regression is statistically significant.
An additional analysis that could be done is an OLS model with fixed effects, robust standard
errors, the control variables, and a lag of DRAPC. However, not enough data has been collected
to perform this analysis; at least one additional year of data is required. Additionally, the fact
that the coefficient on NHW is positive in Regression 4 and negative in Regression 6 may mean
that there are not enough years of data to justify using either a lagged dependent variable or a
fixed-effects model at all.

Discussion of Initial Findings
The initial regression analysis conducted shows a positive but insignificant relationship between
SCPC and DRAPC. A positive coefficient on SCPC in Regression 1 can be interpreted as
meaning an increase in the number of successful intervention court completions per capita is
correlated with an increase in the number of drug-related arrests per capita. One explanation for
this result is that there is a degree of reverse causality in this regression. This would mean that
an increase in successful intervention court completions per capita does not increase the number
of drug-related arrests per capita; rather, an increase in drug-related arrests per capita precipitates
the need for intervention courts, so successful intervention court completions per capita
increases. To attempt to reduce the degree of reverse-causality in the regression, demographic
control variables were included for income (average of median household income weighted by
county), race (percentage of non-Hispanic white residents weighted by county), education
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(percentage of residents with a high-school diploma weighted by county), and urbanization
(percentage of residents who live in urban areas) for each circuit court district. However, after
the introduction of control variables (Table 4.1), the coefficient on SCPC actually increased but
remained insignificant. An increase in the coefficient on SCPC does not support the theory that
there is reverse-causality in the regression, as we would expect the coefficient on SCPC to
decrease when controls are added if there is a degree of the reverse causality present. However,
given that the coefficient on SCPC is statistically insignificant in both Regressions 1 and 2, it
cannot be concluded from those regressions that there is any effect of SCPC on DRAPC.
Given that the coefficients on SCPC in Regressions 1 and 2 are statistically insignificant, it is
still possible that a degree of reverse-causality is present in these regressions. To attempt to
reduce the possible reverse-causality, a lag of DRAPC was introduced to control for inertia in the
data, given that DRAPCt is highly correlated with DRAPCt-1. The resulting model (Regression
3) contained a negative coefficient on SCPC and, when controls were added to this regression
(Regression 4), the coefficient was even more negative. This would mean that an increase in the
number of successful intervention court completions per capita does reduce the number of drugrelated arrests per capita. However, the coefficient on SCPC for Regressions 3 and 4 are also
statistically insignificant. Regressions 5 and 6 continue to reduce the coefficients on SCPC, but
these coefficients are also statistically insignificant. Also, given the fact that the coefficient on
NHW is positive in Regression 4 and negative in Regression 6, there are not enough years of
data to justify using either a lagged dependent variable or a fixed-effects model. Given that there
is no model presented in this paper so far that contains a statistically significant, negative
coefficient on SCPC, it cannot be stated that an increase in the number of successful intervention
court completions per capita causes a decrease in drug-related arrests per capita.
In retrospect, this is unsurprising, given that the number of successful intervention court
completions only explains 0.24% of the variation in drug-related arrests, as shown in Regression
1. One reason for this low goodness of fit could be that the number of successful intervention
court completions in Mississippi from 2018 to 2020 totals only about 3% of the total number of
drug-related arrests in Mississippi over the same time period, so we would not expect successful
intervention court completions per capita to have much effect on drug-related arrests per capita.
Alternatively, it could be that the only correlation between DRAPC and SCPC comes from the
fact that an increasing number of drug-related arrests per capita increases the number of
successful intervention court completions per capita solely because there are now more offenders
that are eligible for the program.
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Chapter 5: When Are Intervention Courts Used?
Because it cannot be determined whether the number of successful intervention court
completions has any effect on the number of drug-related arrests, this chapter explores the
reverse relationship, i.e., whether the number of drug-related arrests or demographic control
variables have any effect on the use of intervention courts. Three additional sets of regressions
are performed in this chapter. The first regresses the intervention court participation rate
(denoted as NCPperDRA) on the number of drug-related arrests per capita and/or demographic
control variables to determine the change in the percentage of drug-related arrests that end in the
offender going through an intervention court program. The second regresses the intervention
court completion rate (denoted as SCperICE) on the number of drug-related arrests per capita
and/or demographic control variables, to determine the effect that rising drug-related arrests have
on the percentage of intervention court participants who graduate from the program. A final set
of regressions regresses the delay in the adoption of intervention courts, compared to the initial
intervention court adoption, (denoted as Delay), on demographic control variables to determine
how demographic characteristics in a district circuit court affected the adoption of intervention
courts.

Descriptive Statistics
The following figure (Figure 5.1) shows the summary statistics for the new variables introduced
in this section.
Figure 5.1: Additional Summary Statistics
ICEPC
NCPPC
NCPperDRA
SCperICE
Delay

Mean
0.02726
0.03371
10.18
52.69
6.794

Median
0.02275
0.03060
5.818
56.19
6.000

S.D.
0.01625
0.02099
9.432
22.18
4.559

Min
0.004766
0.001948
2.193
0.000
0.000

Max
0.07251
0.09359
34.09
87.50
14.00

ICEPC denotes intervention court exits per capita, NCPPC denotes new intervention court participants per
capita, NCPperDRA denotes the intervention court participation rate by circuit court district, SCperICE
denotes the intervention court completion rate by circuit court district, and Delay denotes the delay in
intervention court adoption.

The next figure (Figure 5.2) shows a correlation matrix between the new variables introduced in
this section and DRAPC and the demographic control variables.
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Figure 5.2: Additional Correlation Matrix
NCPperDRA

SCperICE

Delay

-0.6729
-0.4001
-0.4609
-0.4832
-0.1406
1.0000

-0.0203
-0.1174
-0.3348
-0.2417
0.1082
-0.0957
1.0000

-0.1691
0.2713
0.2631
-0.1310
-0.4428
0.2378
0.1389
1.0000

DRAPC
AMHI
NHW
HSD
URB
NCPperDRA
SCperICE
Delay

ICEPC denotes intervention court exits per capita, NCPPC denotes new intervention court participants per
capita, NCPperDRA denotes new intervention court participants per capita as a percentage of drug-related
arrests per capita, SCperICE denotes successful intervention court completions as a percentage of intervention
court exits, and Delay denotes the delay in the adoption of intervention courts.

Intervention court participation (NCPperDRA) is negatively correlated with many of the
variables in the following regressions, with the highest negative correlation existing between it
and DRAPC. This highly-negative correlation means that, when the number of drug-related
arrests increases, the intervention court participation rate decreases by a significant amount. One
possible explanation for this relationship could be that intervention courts only have a certain
capacity of participants they can have at any one time. Thus, the intervention court participation
rate decreases when drug-related arrests per capita increase due to the fact that DRA is in the
denominator of the dependent variable. Therefore, this relationship makes sense.
The intervention court completion rate (SCperICE) is negatively correlated with every other
variable in this correlation matrix except for URB and Delay. The variable that is the most
highly negatively correlated with intervention court completion percentage is NHW, meaning
that areas with a higher number of non-Hispanic Whites have a lower intervention court
completion percentage. One reason for this correlation could be due to the fact that nonHispanic Whites have higher income on average than other races (per the correlation coefficient
between NHW and AMHI in Figure 3.3 above), and, according to Judge Starrett, the “trust-fund
babies” are usually less likely to succeed in an intervention court program.
The variable that is most highly correlated with Delay is URB, and the correlation coefficient
between the two means that more urban areas adopted intervention courts earlier than more rural
areas. Another interesting correlation coefficient exists between Delay and NCPperDRA.
Presumably, districts that are more supportive of intervention court programs would adopt them
sooner and use them more often. Therefore, we should expect that NCPperDRA and Delay
would be negatively correlated. However, the correlation coefficient that exists between these
two variables is positive, at 0.2378. This means that districts that adopted intervention courts
sooner have a lower participation rate today than districts that took more time to adopt
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intervention courts. I would expect that intervention court programs that have been around
longer would be more capable of accommodating a higher number of program participants, so
this correlation coefficient is surprising. One possible reason for this positive correlation could
be that districts that adopted intervention courts sooner than others have worse drug problems,
and prefer to make the intervention court more exclusive to high-risk offenders.

Effect of Drug-Related Arrests on New Intervention Court Participant Rates
The first set of regressions looks at the effect of DRAPC on the intervention court participation
rate (denoted as NCPperDRA). I would expect that an increase in drug-related arrests would
decrease intervention court participation, given that intervention courts only have so much
capacity to accept new participants. The intervention court participation rate is found by
dividing the number of new intervention court participants per capita by the number of drugrelated arrests. The total number of new intervention court participants in 2020 in Mississippi
was 904, while the total number of drug-related arrests in Mississippi during the same period was
16523. The percentage of drug-related arrests in Mississippi that end in the offender being
placed in an intervention court program is higher than the percentage of drug-related arrests in
Mississippi that end in the offender graduating from an intervention court program (about 5.5%
vs. about 3%). Therefore, it can be expected that the effect of DRAPC on the intervention court
participation rate is likely more significant than the effect on successful intervention court
completions as a percentage of drug-related arrests. Additionally, demographic control variables
are added to these regressions to see how income, racial composition, education level, and level
of urbanization affect intervention court participation and completion percentages.
I was able to collect data on the number of new intervention court participants (NCP) from the
same Mississippi Supreme Court Annual Report that I used to collect the number of successful
intervention court completions. Unfortunately, data on NCP was only available for 2020, so
only one year of data is used in this set of regressions, meaning that each regression only
contains 22 observations. To control for the cross-sectional variation in a population that could
skew the results of the regression, I divided the number of NCPs by the total population in each
circuit court district to get NCPPC, the intervention court participants per capita for each circuit
court district.
Regression 7 regresses the intervention court participation rate on the number of drug-related
arrests per capita. Regression 8 adds demographic control variables to Regression 7 as
independent variables. Because only one year of data is available for these analyses, it is not
possible to incorporate a lagged dependent variable into the regression or to perform a fixedeffects analysis. A summary table of the results is shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1:

The first column in the above table specifies which regression is being summarized in that row. The number in
parentheses before the regression description indicates the regression number. OLS indicates an ordinary
least squares regression. “Controls” refer to demographic control variables. Numbers in columns 2-6 show
the coefficient on the variable (the top value), the coefficient for the normalized regression (the middle value),
and the p-value associated with that coefficient (the bottom value). The final column in this table shows the pvalue of the F-statistic for the regression, denoted as p-value(F). P-values with three asterisks (***) indicate
that the coefficient on that variable is statistically significant at an alpha level of 0.01. Two asterisks (**) and
one asterisk (*) indicate that the coefficient on that variable is statistically significant at alpha levels of 0.05
and 0.1, respectively. DRAPC denotes drug-related arrests per capita, NCPperDRA denotes the intervention
court participation rate, AMHI denotes the average of county-level median household incomes, NHW denotes
the percentage of residents who identify as non-Hispanic Whites, HSD denotes the percentage of residents who
have obtained a high school diploma, and URB denotes the percentage of residents who live in urbanized
areas.

(7) Regression 7 contains a statistically significant, negative coefficient on DRAPC of -24.66,
meaning that an increase of one percentage point in drug-related arrests per capita decreases the
percent of intervention court participation for that year by almost 25 percentage points. Granted,
a one percentage point increase in DRAPC would mean that drug-related arrests in the average
district circuit court would more than triple in number. The R2 value of this regression is not
small, at 0.453, meaning that the number of drug-related arrests in Mississippi explains 45.3% of
the variation in intervention court participation.
(8) Regression 8 contains a slightly smaller, statistically significant, negative coefficient on
DRAPC of -21.88. None of the demographic control variables, however, have statistically
significant coefficients. In addition, the p-value(F) of this regression is larger than the p-value of
the coefficient on DRAPC, so it is unlikely that any of the demographic control variables’
coefficients would have any significance on their own. However, the R2 value is slightly higher
in this regression, so the demographic control variables do help explain some of the crosssectional variation in the intervention court participation rate.
Each of these regressions contains a large, negative, statistically significant coefficient on
DRAPC. That means we can say, based on these regressions, that the intervention court
participation rate decreases when drug-related arrests per capita increase.
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Effect of Drug-Related Arrests on Successful Intervention Court Completion
Rates
The next set of regressions (see Table 5.2) looks at how the number of drug-related arrests
affects the effectiveness of DTC programs. An increase in the number of drug-related arrests
would increase the pool of potential intervention court participants. The expectation is that this
could decrease the percentage of intervention court participants who graduate from the program,
given a constant number of intervention court participants, by making the selection process favor
high-risk offenders who may be less likely to succeed, but may be much more important to the
success of the program.
These regressions incorporate a new variable, intervention court exits per capita (ICEPC), as the
denominator of the independent variable. This variable measures the number of intervention
court participants who left the program either through successful completion or incarceration.
The number of participants who were incarcerated as a result of leaving the program was found
on the 2020 Mississippi Supreme Court Annual Report and was added to the number of
successful completions for each circuit court district to get ICE, the number of intervention court
exits. ICE for each circuit court district was then divided by the population in that district to get
intervention court exits per capita.
This set of regressions uses the intervention court completion rate as the dependent variable. The
intervention court completion rate equals the number of successful intervention court
completions divided by the number of intervention court exits and is denoted by SCperICE.
Regression 9 regresses intervention court completion percentage (SCperICE) on the number of
drug-related arrests per capita using ordinary least squares. Regression 10 adds the demographic
control variables as independent variables to Regression 9. Because regressions 1-6 did not
show any effect of successful intervention court completions per capita, it is likely that even with
additional controls added to those regressions we would not see any effect of SCPC on DRAPC.
Because only one year of data is available for these analyses, it is not possible to incorporate a
lagged dependent variable control into the regression or to perform a fixed-effects analysis.
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Table 5.2:

The first column in the above table specifies which regression is being summarized in that row. The number in
parentheses before the regression description indicates the regression number. OLS indicates an ordinary
least squares regression. “Controls” refer to demographic control variables. Numbers in columns 2-6 show
the coefficient on the variable (the top value), the coefficient for the normalized regression (the middle value),
and the p-value associated with that coefficient (the bottom value). The final column in this table shows the pvalue of the F-statistic for the regression, denoted as p-value(F). P-values with three asterisks (***) indicate
that the coefficient on that variable is statistically significant at an alpha level of 0.01. Two asterisks (**) and
one asterisk (*) indicate that the coefficient on that variable is statistically significant at alpha levels of 0.05
and 0.1, respectively. SCperICE denotes the intervention court completion rate, DRAPC denotes drug-related
arrests per capita, AMHI denotes the average of county-level median household incomes, NHW denotes the
percentage of residents who identify as non-Hispanic Whites, HSD denotes the percentage of residents who
have obtained a high school diploma, and URB denotes the percentage of residents who live in urbanized
areas.

(9) Regression 9 contains a negative coefficient on DRAPC, which would mean that an
increasing number of drug-related arrests per capita decreases the average completion rate for
DTCs in Mississippi if the coefficient were statistically significant. However, given that the
coefficient has an incredibly large p-value of 0.936, it is statistically insignificant. Additionally,
the R2 value is very small, meaning that the number of drug-related arrests does not explain
much of the cross-sectional variation in intervention court completion percentage at all.
(10) Regression 10 contains a very large positive coefficient on DRAPC compared to regression
8. However, again, this coefficient is not statistically significant. Likewise, none of the
demographic control variables have statistically significant coefficients. They do help explain
more of the cross-sectional variation in SCperICE, as the R2 of this regression is higher than
Regression 9, but still small.
Given that neither of these regressions has any statistically significant p-values or statistically
significant p-value(F)s, it cannot be stated as to whether or not the number of drug-related arrests
per capita affects the completion percentage for intervention court participants in Mississippi.
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Explaining the Delay in Intervention Court Adoption Using Demographic
Controls
The first intervention court in Mississippi was started in the 14th Judicial Circuit Court in 1999.
Since then, an intervention court has been established in each of the 21 other Judicial Circuit
Courts. An interesting question to ask is how the demographic characteristics of circuit court
districts affected the time it took for the Judicial Circuit Court to adopt an intervention court.
The best way to answer this question would be to regress the delay of adoption compared to the
first intervention court on the demographic characteristics for the year that the corresponding
intervention court was founded. However, since the newest intervention court that I have data on
was founded in 2013, and I only have demographic characteristic data going back to 2018, this is
not possible. Instead, I regressed the delay of adoption from the first intervention court on the
2018 demographic characteristic values. I was only able to obtain the year of adoption for 17 of
the 22 intervention courts, as this information is not readily available online and I have not heard
back from the remaining five intervention courts yet regarding the year they were founded. A
summary of this regression is given in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3

The first column in the above table specifies which regression is being summarized in that row. The number in
parentheses before the regression description indicates the regression number. OLS indicates an ordinary
least squares regression. “Controls” refer to demographic control variables. Numbers in columns 2-6 show
the coefficient on the variable (the top value), the coefficient for the normalized regression (the middle value),
and the p-value associated with that coefficient (the bottom value). The final column in this table shows the pvalue of the F-statistic for the regression, denoted as p-value(F). P-values with three asterisks (***) indicate
that the coefficient on that variable is statistically significant at an alpha level of 0.01. Two asterisks (**) and
one asterisk (*) indicate that the coefficient on that variable is statistically significant at alpha levels of 0.05
and 0.1, respectively. Delay denotes delay in the adoption of intervention court, AMHI denotes the average of
county-level median household incomes, NHW denotes the percentage of residents who identify as nonHispanic Whites, HSD denotes the percentage of residents who have obtained a high school diploma, and URB
denotes the percentage of residents who live in urbanized areas.

There are two variables with statistically significant coefficients in this regression: AMHI and
URB. The interpretation of the coefficient on AMHI is that circuit court districts with higher
income took longer to adopt intervention courts. One possible explanation for this is that
districts with higher income may be less likely to adopt intervention courts due to the political
leanings of the area. The interpretation of the coefficient on URB is that circuit court districts
with a higher percentage of residents living in urban areas took less time to adopt an intervention
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court. One possible reason for this is that it may be more difficult to implement intervention
courts in areas with low concentrations of people. The R2 value of 0.4042 in this regression
means that the demographic variables help to explain 40.42% of the cross-sectional variation in
Delay.

Chapter 6: Conclusion
Intervention courts were implemented in Mississippi to reduce drug crime recidivism, save the
state money by not incarcerating non-violent drug offenders, and improve the lives of drug
addicts and drug abusers across the state. They started out serving the “low hanging fruit”, or
offenders with a low risk of recidivation and a high chance of graduation, but have now moved
on to serving those high-risk offenders who need more help in becoming clean than anybody
else. There are many key components of a successful intervention court. One of those
components is good data collection practices and periodic analyses of intervention court
effectiveness. This paper sought to gauge the effectiveness of Mississippi intervention courts
through data collection and analysis.
Before performing the regression analyses, I expected that an increase in successful intervention
court completions would decrease the number of drug-related arrests. For my first set of
regressions, I regressed drug-related arrests per capita on successful intervention court
completions per capita and demographic variables including household income, racial
composition, education level, and level of urbanization, using ordinary least squares, laggeddependent variable, and fixed-effects methods. The OLS regressions contained positive
coefficients on SCPC, which was the opposite of what I expected. This meant one of two things:
that there was a degree of reverse causality in my regressions or that an increase in SCPC
increases the number of DRAPC. To attempt to reduce the possible degree of reverse-causality
in these regressions, I first added a lag of DRAPC and then used a fixed-effects model. Both of
these models produced negative coefficients on SCPC with and without demographic control
variables. However, the coefficients on SCPC were not statistically significant in any of these
regressions, and very few coefficients on the demographic characteristic variables were
statistically significant. It could not be concluded that there was any effect of SCPC on DRAPC.
Given that there were only three years of data on these variables, it is possible that with a few
additional years of data, more coefficients could be statistically significant and an effect of SCPC
on DRAPC could be observed.
Next, I decided to see how the number of drug-related arrests per capita affects the intervention
court participation rate by regressing NCPperDRA on DRAPC and demographic control
variables. With no demographic control variables present, a statistically significant, large,
negative coefficient on DRAPC was produced. With demographic control variables present, the
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effect was still large and negative, but not quite as large. This means that an increased number of
drug-related arrests drastically decreases the intervention court participation rate. This is most
likely due to the fact that intervention courts only have a certain capacity of offenders they can
allow to participate at any one time. If intervention courts wish to be prepared for possible
increases in drug-related arrests in the future, a good measure they could take would be to
increase the amount of staff at their courts to better handle an increased number of drug-addicted
or drug-abusing offenders who need the help that intervention courts provide.
I then decided to see how the number of drug-related arrests per capita affects the intervention
court success rate by regressing SCperICE on DRAPC and demographic control variables.
Again, none of my coefficients were statistically significant, so it could not be concluded that
DRAPC or any of the demographic control variables had any effect on the drug court success
rate from my regressions. Given that there was only one year of data available for this set of
regressions, it is possible that additional years of data could produce statistically significant
coefficients on some or all of the variables in these regressions.
Finally, I wanted to see how the delay in the adoption of intervention courts is affected by
demographic control variables. I found that areas with a higher average income took longer to
adopt intervention courts and that areas with a higher percentage of residents living in urban
areas adopted intervention courts more quickly.
While many of the regressions performed in this paper did not produce very many statistically
significant coefficients, there is certainly a possibility for future research to obtain statistically
significant coefficients on these regressions. Some ways that this could be done are:
1.

The use of an instrumental variable to completely get rid of any degree of reversecausality.
2. An analysis of many individual intervention court participants that includes recidivism
follow-ups at certain time frames in the future rather than an analysis of aggregate
intervention court data.
3. Additional demographic control variables could explain more of the cross-sectional
variation in the dependent variables.
4. Additional years of data to provide more observations.
If some or all of these measures are taken, it is possible that future research could be able to
reach a conclusion on the effect of successful intervention court completions on drug-related
arrests in Mississippi, the effect of drug-related arrests on intervention court completion rates in
Mississippi, and the effect of other demographic control variables on the delay in adoption of
intervention court programs by districts.
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Appendix:
Regression 2:
Model 2: Pooled OLS, using 66 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 3
Dependent variable: DRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
--------------------------------------------------------const
-3.49682
0.994441
-3.516
0.0021 ***
SCPC
2.81269
2.75800
1.020
0.3194
AMHI
5.83461e-06
8.66258e-06
0.6735
0.5079
NHW
0.000719256
0.00375807
0.1914
0.8501
HSD
0.0443279
0.0141687
3.129
0.0051 ***
URB
-0.000937017
0.00220200
-0.4255
0.6748
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(5, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho

0.485200
2.493119
0.537367
19.08240
14.46202
-3.786108
0.681014

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.287936
0.203843
0.498814
3.58e-07
‚àí16.92404
‚àí11.73262
0.425781

Normalized Regression 2:
Model 3: Pooled OLS, using 66 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 3
Dependent variable: NormalizedDRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
----------------------------------------------------------------const
8.44796e-06
0.131845
6.407e-05
0.9999
NormalizedSCPC
0.118128
0.115831
1.020
0.3194
NormalizedAMHI
0.178135
0.264474
0.6735
0.5079
NormalizedNHW
0.0395798
0.206802
0.1914
0.8501
NormalizedHSD
0.593133
0.189585
3.129
0.0051 ***
NormalizedURB
-0.0645570
0.151709
-0.4255
0.6748
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(5, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho
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1.30e-06
30.07039
0.537367
19.08240
-67.70819
160.5543
0.681014

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.999988
0.707936
0.498814
3.58e-07
147.4164
152.6078
0.425781

Regression 3:

Model 4: Pooled OLS, using 44 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 2
Dependent variable: DRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------const
0.103445
0.0374014
2.766
0.0116
**
SCPC
-0.597697
1.44701
-0.4131
0.6838
DRAPCt-1
0.812709
0.0532113
15.27
7.59e-13 ***
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(2, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho

0.486803
0.652487
0.801415
158.2377
30.21208
-49.07160
-0.206571

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.276426
0.126152
0.791728
2.17e-13
-54.42417
-52.43918
1.118025

Normalized Regression 3:
Model 5: Pooled OLS, using 44 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 2
Dependent variable: NormalizedDRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient std. error t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------------const
0.00563023 0.0638721
0.08815 0.9306
NormalizedSCPC
-0.0251023
0.0607721
-0.4131
0.6838
NormalizedDRAPCt-1
0.812709
0.0532113
15.27
7.59e-13 ***
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(2, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho
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0.005566
7.869876
0.801415
158.2377
-24.56805
60.48868
-0.206571

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.960012
0.438119
0.791728
2.17e-13
55.13611
57.12110
1.118025

Regression 4:
Model 6: Pooled OLS, using 44 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 2
Dependent variable: DRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
---------------------------------------------------------const
0.850583
0.698805
1.217
0.2370
SCPC
-1.08492
1.42109
-0.7634
0.4537
AMHI
1.54116e-06
1.94518e-06
0.7923
0.4370
NHW
0.00402362
0.00148208
2.715
0.0130
**
HSD
-0.0122835
0.00944085
-1.301
0.2073
URB
0.000195325
0.000945397
0.2066
0.8383
DRAPCt-1
0.805252
0.0888497
9.063
1.05e-08 ***
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(6, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho

0.486803
0.509205
0.845023
66.15442
35.66680
-44.84427
-0.743282

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.276426
0.117313
0.819892
1.51e-12
-57.33360
-52.70195
1.417866

Normalized Regression 4:
Model 7: Pooled OLS, using 44 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 2
Dependent variable: NormalizedDRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
----------------------------------------------------------------const
0.0182055
0.0483227
0.3767
0.7101
NormalizedSCPC
-0.0455650
0.0596834
-0.7634
0.4537
NormalizedAMHI
0.0470527
0.0593876
0.7923
0.4370
NormalizedNHW
0.221415
0.0815573
2.715
0.0130
**
NormalizedHSD
-0.164361
0.126324
-1.301
0.2073
NormalizedURB
0.0134572
0.0651343
0.2066
0.8383
NormalizedDRAPCt-1
0.805252
0.0888497
9.063
1.05e-08 ***
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(6, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho
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0.005566
6.141695
0.845023
66.15442
-19.11334
64.71601
-0.743282

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.960012
0.407421
0.819892
1.51e-12
52.22668
56.85833
1.417866

Regression 5:
Model 8: Fixed-effects, using 66 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 3
Dependent variable: DRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------const
0.525151
0.0261799
20.06
3.54e-15 ***
SCPC
-2.18070
1.42903
‚àí1.526
0.1419
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
LSDV R-squared
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho

0.485200
0.514389
0.904548
66.54626
-36.73047
-0.396871

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Within R-squared
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.287936
0.109373
0.033358
-87.09253
-67.19209
1.529075

Joint test on named regressors Test statistic: F(1, 21) = 2.32866
with p-value = P(F(1, 21) > 2.32866) = 0.141932
Robust
Null
Test
with
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test for differing group intercepts hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
statistic: Welch F(21, 15.4) = 85.9996
p-value = P(F(21, 15.4) > 85.9996) = 2.56553e-12

Normalized Regression 5:
Model 9: Fixed-effects, using 66 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 3
Dependent variable: NormalizedDRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
---------------------------------------------------------------const
1.46814e-06
1.07802e-07
13.62
6.82e-12 ***
NormalizedSCPC
-0.0915858
0.0600170
-1.526
0.1419
Mean dependent var
1.30e-06
Sum squared resid
6.204225
LSDV R-squared
0.904548
Log-likelihood
-15.62394
Schwarz criterion
127.6099
rho
-0.396871

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Within R-squared
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.999988
0.379848
0.033358
77.24789
97.14833
1.529075

Joint test on named regressors Test statistic: F(1, 21) = 2.32866
with p-value = P(F(1, 21) > 2.32866) = 0.141932
Robust
Null
Test
with
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test for differing group intercepts hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
statistic: Welch F(21, 15.4) = 85.9996
p-value = P(F(21, 15.4) > 85.9996) = 2.56553e-12

Regression 6:
Model 10: Fixed-effects, using 66 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 3
Dependent variable: DRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
Omitted due to exact collinearity: URB
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
--------------------------------------------------------const
2.43641
1.21516
2.005
0.0580 *
SCPC
-1.84906
1.48383
-1.246
0.2264
AMHI
9.66944e-06
6.61122e-06
1.463
0.1584
NHW
-0.0419085
0.0155462
-2.696
0.0135 **
HSD
-0.00163563
0.00840825
-0.1945
0.8476
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
LSDV R-squared
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho

0.485200
0.452213
0.916086
70.79754
-32.66406
-0.444257

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Within R-squared
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.287936
0.106326
0.150199
-89.59508
-67.09893
1.539884

Joint test on named regressors Test statistic: F(4, 21) = 3.35907
with p-value = P(F(4, 21) > 3.35907) = 0.0283097
Robust
Null
Test
with
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test for differing group intercepts hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
statistic: Welch F(21, 15.9) = 15.85
p-value = P(F(21, 15.9) > 15.85) = 4.51411e-07

Normalized Regression 6:
Model 11: Fixed-effects, using 66 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 3
Dependent variable: NormalizedDRAPC
Robust (HAC) standard errors
Omitted due to exact collinearity: NormalizedURB
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
---------------------------------------------------------------const
-8.75506e-08
5.05001e-06
-0.01734
0.9863
NormalizedSCPC
-0.0776574
0.0623184
-1.246
0.2264
NormalizedAMHI
0.295214
0.201845
1.463
0.1584
NormalizedNHW
-2.30618
0.855491
-2.696
0.0135 **
NormalizedHSD
-0.0218857
0.112507
-0.1945
0.8476
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
LSDV R-squared
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
rho

1.30e-06
5.454298
0.916086
-11.37267
131.6764
-0.444257

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Within R-squared
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
Durbin-Watson

0.999988
0.369266
0.150199
74.74533
97.24149
1.539884

Joint test on named regressors Test statistic: F(4, 21) = 3.35907
with p-value = P(F(4, 21) > 3.35907) = 0.0283097
Robust
Null
Test
with
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test for differing group intercepts hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
statistic: Welch F(21, 15.9) = 15.85
p-value = P(F(21, 15.9) > 15.85) = 4.51411e-07

Regression 7:
Model 12: Pooled OLS, using 22 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: NCPperDRA
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
------------------------------------------------------const
22.1212
4.71265
4.694
0.0001 ***
DRAPC
-24.6565
7.33543
-3.361
0.0030 ***
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(1, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion

10.18250
1022.366
0.452786
11.29824
73.44380
153.0697

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

9.432239
7.149706
0.425425
0.002954
150.8876
151.4016

Normalized Regression 7:
Model 13: Pooled OLS, using 22 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: NormalizedNCPperDRA
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
--------------------------------------------------------------const
-0.00255241
0.161089
-0.01584
0.9875
NormalizedDRAPC
-0.752696
0.223931
-3.361
0.0030 ***
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(1, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion

33

0.000053
11.49160
0.452786
11.29823
24.07296
54.32800

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

1.000004
0.758011
0.425425
0.002954
52.14592
52.65995

Regression 8:
Model 14: Pooled OLS, using 22 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: NCPperDRA
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
----------------------------------------------------------const
49.4290
74.0230
0.6678
0.5116
DRAPC
-21.8826
7.22295
-3.030
0.0064 ***
AMHI
0.000312945
0.000242979
1.288
0.2118
NHW
-0.138296
0.210688
-0.6564
0.5187
HSD
-0.396238
1.05989
-0.3738
0.7123
URB
-0.0605323
0.197230
-0.3069
0.7619
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(5, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion

10.18250
946.1888
0.493559
2.174771
-72.59204
163.7303

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

9.432239
7.690046
0.335296
0.095875
157.1841
158.7262

Normalized Regression 8:
Model 15: Pooled OLS, using 22 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: NormalizedNCPperDRA
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------------const
-0.0506993
0.178621
0.2838
0.7793
NormalizedDRAPC
-0.668018
0.220497
-3.030
0.0064 ***
NormalizedAMHI
0.291671
0.226461
1.288
0.2118
NormalizedNHW
-0.232321
0.353931
-0.6564
0.5187
NormalizedHSD
-0.161852
0.432939
-0.3738
0.7123
NormalizedURB
-0.127313
0.414818
-0.3069
0.7619
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(5, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion

34

0.000053
10.63535
0.493559
2.174770
-23.22120
64.98866

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

1.000004
0.815297
0.335296
0.095875
58.44240
59.98450

Regression 9:
Model 16: Pooled OLS, using 22 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: SCperICE
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------const
53.5347
12.9571
4.132
0.0005 ***
DRAPC
-1.74805
21.3573
-0.08185
0.9355
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(1, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion

52.68830
10328.10
0.000412
0.006699
-98.88404
203.9502

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

22.18145
22.72454
-0.049568
0.935543
201.7681
202.2821

Normalized Regression 9:
Model 17: Pooled OLS, using 22 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: NormalizedSCperICE
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------------const
-6.48844e-05
0.218068
-0.0002975 0.9998
NormalizedDRAPC -0.0226921
0.277248
-0.08185
0.9355
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(1, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
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0.000014
20.99220
0.000412
0.006699
-30.70084
67.58377

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

1.000020
1.024505
-0.049568
0.935543
65.40169
65.91572

Regression 10:
Model 18: Pooled OLS, using 22 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: SCperICE
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
---------------------------------------------------------const
320.840
171.520
1.871
0.0754 *
DRAPC
33.0502
27.9856
1.181
0.2508
AMHI
0.00107326
0.00100505
1.068
0.2977
NHW
-0.688413
0.486849
-1.414
0.1720
HSD
-3.68665
2.69918
-1.366
0.1864
URB
0.223867
0.377632
0.5928
0.5596
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(5, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion

52.68830
7397.258
0.284068
1.590336
-95.21269
208.9716

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

22.18145
21.50183
0.060339
0.206220
202.4254
203.9675

Normalized Regression 10:
Model 19: Pooled OLS, using 22 observations
Included 22 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: NormalizedSCperICE
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------------const
-0.0373823
0.227589
-0.1643
0.8711
NormalizedDRAPC
0.429037
0.363291
1.181
0.2508
NormalizedAMHI
0.425364
0.398331
1.068
0.2977
NormalizedNHW
-0.491768
0.347781
-1.414
0.1720
NormalizedHSD
-0.640365
0.468844
-1.366
0.1864
NormalizedURB
0.200220
0.337743
0.5928
0.5596
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(5, 21)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
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0.000014
15.03518
0.284068
1.590336
-27.02950
72.60525

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

1.000020
0.969380
0.060339
0.206220
66.05900
67.60110

Regression 11:
Model 20: Pooled OLS, using 17 observations
Included 17 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: Delay
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
---------------------------------------------------------const
9.61948
33.3544
0.2884
0.7767
AMHI
0.000360035
0.000188572
1.909
0.0743 *
NHW
-0.0764666
0.0887117
-0.8620
0.4014
HSD
-0.107916
0.517012
-0.2087
0.8373
URB
-0.140934
0.0767600
-1.836
0.0850 *
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(4, 16)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion

6.794118
198.1214
0.404199
5.940799
-44.99512
104.1563

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

4.558847
4.063264
0.205599
0.003973
99.99024
100.4044

Normalized Regression 11:
Model 21: Pooled OLS, using 17 observations
Included 17 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 1
Dependent variable: NormalizedDelay
Robust (HAC) standard errors
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
------------------------------------------------------------const
-0.135487
0.248440
-0.5453
0.5930
NormalizedAMHI
0.694276
0.363635
1.909
0.0743 *
NormalizedNHW
-0.265775
0.308335
-0.8620
0.4014
NormalizedHSD
-0.0912035
0.436945
-0.2087
0.8373
NormalizedURB
-0.613288
0.334028
-1.836
0.0850 *
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(4, 16)
Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion
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3.87e-06
9.533015
0.404199
5.940800
-19.20511
52.57629

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn

1.000010
0.891301
0.205599
0.003973
48.41022
48.82434
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